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RECENT CASES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FIRST AMENDMENT-STATE PROHIBITION OF
ALL ADVERTISING BY A LAWYER IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL
Appellants were attorneys licensed to practice law in the State
of Arizona and were members of the State Bar of Arizona.' They
purchased newspaper space,2 advertising their practice3 and offer-
ing "legal services at very reasonable fees."14  They also printed
prices for certain services5 rendered by the law firm.6 It was un-
denied that the advertisement violated the Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility, which forbade advertising by lawyers.? Based on a com-
plaint filed by the President of the State Bar, a Special Local Ad-
ministrative Committee recommended that appellants be suspended.s
Upon the record developed at the initial hearing," appellants sought
review before the Supreme Court of Arizona. They argued, among
other things, 1° that the Code's ban on advertising violated the Sher-
man Act1 and infringed upon their first amendment rights. The
1. The State Bar of Arizona is controlled by the Supreme Court of Arizona. ARIZ. SUp.
CT. R. 27(a) (1973). No person is permitted 'to practice law in the state or hold himself
out as one who may practice law in the state unless he is an active member of the or-
ganization. Id.
2. Arizona Republic (Phoenix), Feb. 22, 1976, reprinted in Bates v. State Bar of Ari-
zona, - U.S.- , - , 97 S.Ct. 2691, 2710 (1977).
3. The "Legal Clinic of Bates and O'Steen" accepted only routine matters which were
easily handled through the use of paralegals, automatic typewriting equipment, and
standardized forms and office procedure. Because the return on each fee charged was
low, a substantial volume of business was necessary. Id. at 2694.
4. Id. at 2710.
5. The services mentioned were the uncontested divorce, uncontested adoption, un-
contested personal bankruptcy, an-d change of name. Id.
6. The advertisement stated that "information regarding other types of cases fur-
nished on request." Id.
7. 97 S.Ct. at 2694. ARIZ. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 2-101(B) provides
as follows: "A lawyer shall not publicize himself, or his partner, or associate, or any
other lawyer affiliated with him or his firm, as a lawyer through newspaper or magazine
advertisements .... " ARIZ. SuP. CT. R. 29 (a) (1976).
8. The initial hearing concluded with a recommendation for suspension from the
practice of law for not less than six months. Review taken by the Board of Governors of
the State Bar resulted in a reduction of the period of suspension to one week. 97 S.Ct.
at 2695.
9. A record was developed at the hearing in anticipation of a challenge in the courts
to the validity of the rule. Id.
10. Additional arguments were based on equal protection, due process and vagueness.
These, too, were rejected and were not relied upon in, aprellants' brief to the United States
Supreme Court. Matter of Bates, 113 Ariz. 394, 555 P.2d 640 (1976).
11. The Sherman Act provides in part as follows: "Every contract, combination in the
form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, In restraint of trade or commerce among the
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court rejected these claims, 12 but did reduce the sanction from sus-
pension to censure,'13 finding that the advertising was done in good
faith to test the constitutionality of the Code's ban on advertising."
Appellants appealed to the United States Supreme Court. 15 The Court
agreed that the ban on advertising was not a violation of the Sher-
man Act,' e but held' that the state may not prohibit the publication
in a newspaper of an attorney's truthful advertisement concerning
the availability and terms of routine legal services. Bates v. State
Bar of Arizona, - U.S.- , 97 S.Ct. 2691 (1977).
Traditional proscriptions against solicitation, advertising, and
self-laudation probably originated in England." The aristocracy, fill-
ing the positions in the legal profession, scorned lower class "trade"
practices, and because public service was emphasized, earning a liv-
ing became secondary. 9
In the United States, the American Bar Association adopted Can-
on 27 in 1908,20 dealing with direct and indirect advertising. As origi-
nally adopted,2' Canon 27 stressed that a "well-merited reputation for
professional capacity and fidelity to trust ' 22 was the most effective
several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal: ...... 15 U.S.C. § 1
(1970 & Supp. III 1973).
12. Matter of Bates, 113 Ariz. 394, 555 P.2d 640, (1976).
13. Mr. Justice Rehnquist stayed the order of censure pending final determination by
the United States Supreme Court. 97 S.Ct. at 2696 n.10 (1977).
14. 113 Ariz. at 400, 555 P.2d at 646.
15. Probable jurisdiction noted, Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 429 U.S. 813 (1977).
16. The decision of the Court was unanimous in affirming the Supreme Court of Ari-
zona's rejection of the appellants' Sherman Act argument. Bates v. State Bar of Arizona,
- U.S.-, - , 97 S Ct. 2691, 2969 (1977). Rejection of this argument was based on the
long standing doctrine of Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350 (1943), where the Court
found "nothing in the language of the Sherman Act or in its history . . . suggest[ing]
that its purpose was to restrain a state or its officers or agents from activities directed
by its legislature." Sce also Peoples Cab Co. v. Bloom, 330 F. Supp. 1235 (W.D. Pa.
1971), a/I'd, 472 F.2d 163 (3d Cir. 1972).
This state action exception has been internreted not to be limited to acts of the
legislature, providing the regulation Is found to be an exercise of a valid governmental
function. See Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 355 F. Supp. 491 (E.D. Va. 1973) (act of
8tate judiciary), a/I'd, 497 F.2d 1 (4th Cir. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 421 U.S. 773
(1975) ; Gas Light Co. of Columbus v. Georgia Power Co., 313 F. Supp. 860 (M.D. Ga.
1970) (act of public service commission).
The appellants analogized their situation to that In Goldfarb, where a minimum
fee schedule for attorneys was held to be anticompetitive activity of the type the Sher-
man Act proscribed. The Court here, however, distinguished Goldfarb by viewing the ex-
tent of state action involved in each case. In Goldfarb, the State Bar was merely en-
forcing the minimum fee schedule of a county bar association. In contrast, the restraint
complained of in the case at bar involved the affirmative command of the Arizona Su-
preme Court. 97 S.Ct. at 2696.
17. Although the Court split 5-4 on the first amendment issue, only Mr. Justice Rehn-
quist's dissent stated that legal advertising of any kind was undeserving of first amend-
ment protection. 97 S.Ct. at 2719. The remaining dissenters implied that certain forms of
legal advertising might be constitutionally protected. Id. at 2711 (Burger, C.J., dissenting)
(publication of probable range of fees); Id. at 2717 (Powell, J., Stewart, J., dissenting)
(publication of specific hourly rates).
18. R. WISE, LEGAL ETHICS 127 (Supp. 1977).
19. Id.
20. Prior to 1908, no general proscription of lawyer advertising existed in the United
States. Note, Advertising, Solicitation and the Profession's Dit y to Make Legal Counsel
Available, 81. YALE L.J. 1181, 1182 (1972). The State of Alabama had a similar provision
as early as 1887. I d . at 1182 n.7.
21. Canon 27 was amended in 1937, 1940, 1942, 1943 and 1963. See supra note 18.
22. H. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 316 n.6 (1953), citing ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL
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advertisement of a lawyer. The Canon prohibited all advertising, di-
rect and indirect, but permitted the "publication or circulation of or-
dinary simple business cards .... ,,23
In 1969, the American Bar Association abandoned the Canons, 
2
substituting the more workable Code of Professional Responsibility. 3
The rule challenged2 6 in Bates was one of a number of rules under
Canon 2, the replacement for Canon 27.
Past constitutional challenges to restrictions on professional ad-
vertising have been unsuccessful, the Supreme Court having found
the restrictions to be a valid exercise of the police power by the
states to protect the public health, safety, welfare and morals.2 7 The
Court recently announced that the states have an interest in regulat-
ing members of the legal profession as well.2 8 Bates, however, was
a case of first impression in that the attack on the advertising ban's
constitutionality was based on the first amendment, and not upon
the commerce clause or some other constitutional ground.2 9
The decision in Bates was greatly facilitated by the Court's hold-
ing in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Con-
sumer Council.30 There the Court considered the validity, under the
first amendment, of a Virginia statute declaring that a pharmacist
was guilty of unprofessional conduct if he advertised prescription
drug pricesA1 In finding that the statute was unconstitutional, the
Court held that commercial speech3 2 was entitled to first amend-
ment protection.3 3 This was a holding on a matter of first impres-
sion3 4 and despite the Court's attempt to limit its opinion to the
ETHICS No. 27.
23. Id.
24. The Canons were outdated. Preface to ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
at 1 (1976).
25. The nine Canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility are each followed by
numerous Ethical Considerations and Disciplinary Rules, the Rules stating the minimum
level of conduct acceptable before a lawyer becomes subject to disciplinary action.
26. ABA CooE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-101(B) (1976), the pertinent part
of which is cited supra note 7.
27. See Head v. New Mexico Bd., 374 U.S. 424 (1963) (optometrists); Williamson v.
Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (opticians); Semler v. Oregon State Bd., 294 U.S.
608 (1935) (dentists).
28. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 792 (1975).
29. See Virginia State Bd. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976)
(first time such a challenge was before the Court, but involving a pharmacist). Although
Goldfarb concerned lawyer advertising, the challenge there was grounded on statutory
construction of the Sherman Act. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
30. 4.25 U.S. 748 (1976).
S1. VA. CODE ANN. § 54-524.35 (1974).
32. The Court, for purposes of this case, characterized commercial speech in this state-
ment: "I will sell you the X prescription drug at the Y price." 425 U.S. at 761. This
fornmulation fits the situation of a lawyer advertising his product. Brief for Appellant at
32, Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 97 S.Ct. 2691 (1977) (hereinafter cited as Brief for
Appellant].
33. 425 U.S. at 770.
34. Until Virginia Pharmacy, the status commercial speech occupied under first
amendment protections was questionable. Id. at 758-61. Valentine v. Christensen,
316 U.S. 52, 54 11942), held that the first amendment imposed "no such re-
straint on government as respects purely commercial advertising." This deci-
sion withstood critical review until the Court, in Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S.
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selling of "standardized products," 35 the way was made clear for a
lawyer to challenge the ban on similar legal advertising."8
In his opinion for the majority in Bates, Mr. Justice Blackmun
made a point to narrow the first amendment issue.37 The case did
not address the problems of advertising relating to the "quality" 3
8
of legal services, to in-person solicitation of clients, 39 or to adver-
tising by lawyers already allowed by the Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility.40
Restrictions on first amendment freedoms will be allowed only
upon a showing of "a compelling state interest in the regulation of a
subject within the State's constitutional power. . .. ,,4, A number of
justifications for regulating price advertising by lawyers were offered
in Bates to show such a compelling interest. Among those offered
and rejected were the adverse effect on professionalism, 42 the mis-
leading nature of attorney advertising 4 3 the undesirable effect of
stirring up litigation,'4 the undesirable economic effects of advertis-
809 (1975), limited Valentine to say that reasonable regulation of the manner In which
commercial advertising could be distributed is permissible. Id. at 819. The appellant In
Bigelow had violated a statute by publishing in his newspaper an advertisement of
another providing Information about abortions. Because the advertisement conveyed in-
formation of "public interest," the Court felt It deserved first amendment protection. Id.
at 822. On the groundwork of Bigelow, the Court in irginia Pharmacy put to rest the
idea that commercial speech was unprotected, even if the advertiser's motive was eco-
nomic. 425 U.S. at 762.
35. "We stress that we have considered in this case the regulation of commercial ad-
vertisement by pharmacists. Although we express no opinion as to other professions, the
distinctions, historical and functional, between professions, may require consideration of
quite different factors. Physicians and lawyers, for example, do not dispense standardized
products .. " 425 U.S. at 773 n.25. See also the concurring opinion of Mr. Chief Justice
Burger. Id. at 774.
36. As to the probability of preventing the Virginia Pharmacy holding from affecting
proscriptions of advertising by members of other professions, Mr. Justice Rehnquist, in
his dissent, said as follows: "But if the sole limitation on permissible state proscription of
advertising is that it may not be false or misleading surely the differences between pharma-
cists' advertising and lawyers' and doctors' advertising can be only one of degree and not
of kind." Id. at 785.
37. 97 S.Ct. at 2700.
38. The advertisement made no claim concerning the quality of the services rendered.
Id. By narrowing the Issue not to include considerations of quality, a legal service could be
made to look more like a "standardized product," and therefore outside the disclaimer
of Virginia Pharmacy. Supra note 35.
39. In-person solicitation of clients is prohibited by ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPoN-
STBILITY DR 2-103(A) (1976). This rule was not being challenged by the appellants.
40. Rule 2-102(A) (6) allows the publication of specified office and biographical infor-
maition in recognized law lists, law directories and classified sections of the telephone di-
rectory.
41. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963). See Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809,
826: Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 342 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 407
(1963).
42. 97 S.Ct. at 2701. It was argued that commercialization would undermine the attor-
ney's self-image, his reputation In the community, and his orientation to the service
function of his profession. High professional standards are guaranteed, however, by the
close regulation professionals are subject to by the state. 425 U.S. at 768. See NAACP
v. Button, :,71 U.S. 415, 43S (1963).
43. 97 S.Ct. at 2703. Appellants argued that it was inconsistent with the first aimend'-
ment to ban all advertising because some mieht be misleading. Brief for Appellant at 46,
citing Hlett v. United States, 415 F.2d 664, 671 (5th Cir. 1969), cart. denied, 397 U.S. 936
(1970).
44. 97 S.Ct. at 2704. But see Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia State Bar, 177 U.S. 1
(1964), where the Court recognized the view that the public Interest is served by the
encouragement of litigation.
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ing,"5 the adverse effect of advertising on the quality of service ren-
dered,4 6 and the difficulties of enforcement.4 7 The only claim found
to have any merit was that advertising would be misleading if only
advertising were considered in selecting an attorney.48 This was dis-
counted, however, as a justification which underestimated the pub-
lic.4"
Although no justification was found to be acceptable for the sup-
pression of all advertising by lawyers, the Court would not give first
amendment protection to appellants' advertising until appellants dem-
onstrated -specifically that their advertising was protected.5 0  The
Court thereby refused to apply the first amendment overbreadth doc-
trine, a court-created exception to the standing rules, 51 to commercial
speech.5 2 Nevertheless, appellee's arguments that the advertisement
was misleading 5 did not convince the Court that the advertisement
should be suppressed.
Speech is not absolutely protected by the first amendment.5 4 The
fact that advertising by lawyers is within the scope of free speech
protections does not restrain the states from reasonably regulating
the time, place, and manner of advertising,55 or from suppressing
advertising of illegal transactions, 6 or from prohibiting advertising
45. 97 S.Ct. at 2705. The Court stated that the costs of advertising would not distinguish
a lawyer from a pharmacist or any other advertiser. Id. at 2706.
46. Id. Using the same response it gave in Virginia Pharmacy, the Court felt that "an
attorney who Is inclined to cut quality will do so regardless of the rule on advertising." Id.
See 425 U.S. at 769.
47. 97 S.Ct. at 2706.
48. Id. at 2704.
49. Id. See 425 U.S. at 769-70. The Court suggested services of the lawyer which may
be conducive to advertising: "[T]he routine ones: the uncontested divorce, the simple
adoption, the uncontested personal bankruptcy, the change of name, and the like .. .
97 S.Ct. at 2703.
50. Id. at 2707.
51. The traditional rules governing constitutional adjudication Include the principle that
one may not constitutionally challenge a statute on the ground that it may conceivably be
applied unconstitutionally to others in situations not before the Court. Because the first
amendment requires "breathing space," however, the Court has altered its standing rules
to allow first amendment attack on overly broad statutes without requiring the challenging
party to show that his conduct could not be regulated by a more narrowly drawn statute.
Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 419 U.S. 601, 611-12 (1973); Do-mbrowski v. Pfister, 380 ('.S.
479, 486 (1965).
The reason for the rule is that an overbroad statute may have 'a "chilling effect"
I.e., protected speech will be muted by the it terrorem effect of the statute. Broadrick V.
Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612 (1973).
52. Application of the overbreadth doctrine is manifestly "Strong medicine." It has been
applied -by the Court only as a last resort. Id. at 613. "Since advertising is the sine qua
non of commercial profits, there Is little likelihood of its being chilled by proper regula,
tion and foregone entirely." Virginia State Bd. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425
U.S. 748, 771 n. 2 4.
53. The Arizona State Bar contended that the advertisement was misleading because It
used the undefined term "clinic" to describe the law practice, the fee advertised for an. un-
contested divorce was not Indicative of a "very reasonable price," and the advertisement
failed to state that certain services advertised could be obtalned without the aid of a
lawyer. 97 S.Ct. at 2708.
54. Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36, 49 n.10 (1961). Appellants agreed
that Some restrictions are required and did not ask for absolute protection. Brief for
Appellant at 53.
55. 97 S.Ct. at 2709.
56. Id.
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that is false, deceptive, or misleading. 57
The stimulus of Bates brought an immediate response. On Au-
gust 10, 1977, only weeks after the Bates decision, the American Bar
Association's policy-making House of Delegates approved new rules
for lawyer advertising.58 The House of Delegates considered two pro-
posals, "A" and "B," and accepted proposal "A." 5 9 Proposal "A"
describes the types of information publishable.0 ° It permits adver-
tising not only in newspapers, 61 but in all print media and in radio
broadcasting 2  Proposal "B," unlike its counterpart, would abandon
all specific authorizations and would allow the publication of all in-
formation not "false, fraudulent, misleading or deceptive.1 63 While
the American Bar Association adopted proposal "A," both proposals
have been circulated to the state regulatory bodies for their consid-
eration.6 '
North Dakota lawyers, at the time of Bates, were subject to the
same advertising proscription which brought the challenge to the
Supreme Court.6 5 The authority to make rules for the conduct of the
legal profession of this state is vested in two bodies. The North Da-
kota Supreme Court has been granted both constitutional"6 and stat-
utory67 powers to regulate the profession. In practice, however, -it
has been the State Bar Association of North Dakota6 8 which has in-
itiated action to adopt or amend rules of the North Dakota Code
57. See Virginia State 1d. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 771, and
Mr. Justice Stewart's concurring opinion at 777.
58. House of Delegates Adopts Advertising D.R. and Endorses a Package of Grand Jury
Reforms, 63 A.B.A.J. 1234 (1977).
59. Id.
60. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-101(B) (1977). Proposal "A"
begins with a general standard that prohibits "a false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive,
self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim." 63 A.B.A.J. 1234, 1235 (1977), citing ABA.
CODE OF' PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILIrY DR 2-101(A) (1977). This proposal is termed "re-
strictive regulatory." 63 A.B.A.J. 1234 (1977). The categories of information which may
be published can be described as office, biographical and fee information, and are set
forth In detail. Id.
61. The holding In Bates was limited to publication in newspapers. 97 S.Ct. at 2709. Mr.
Justice Powell and Mr. Justice Stewart, however, were not reassured by the majority's
limited holding when in dissent both said as follows: "[ilt is clear that today's decision
cannot be confined on a principled basis to price advertisements in newspapers ... " Id.
at 2718 n.12.
62. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONS11ILITY DR 2-101(B) (1977) allows publication
or broadcast of information "in print media distributed or over radio broadcasts in the
geographic area or areas in which the lawyer resides or maintains offices or in which a
significant part of the lawyer's clientele resides .. " The mechanics for authorizing other
electronic broadcast media as means for advertising, e.g., television, is provided in ABA
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-101(C) (1977).
63. 63 A.B.A.J. 1234 (1977). This proposal Is termed I'directive." Id.
64. Id,
65. N.D. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-101(B) (Jan. 1977).
66. The constitution provides that the "sunreme court shall have authority . . . to
promulgate rules and regulations for the admission to practice, conduct, disciplining, and
disbarment of attorneys at law." N.D. CO NST. art. IV, § 87.
67. The North Dakota Century Code also grants authority to the North Dakota Supreme
Court to regulate the legal profession. N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-)2-07 (1974).
68. The State Bar Association of North Dakota was created by the legislature of North
Dakota in 1921. N.D. CENT. ConE § 27-12-01 (1974). Every licensed member of the legal
profession of North Dakota Is a member of the State Bar Association of North Dakota.
N.D. CENT. COPE ! 27-12-02 (1974).
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of Professional Responsibility."
On September 17, 1977, the Executive Committee of the State
Bar Association of North Dakota adopted proposal "A" during a short
transitional period while the Ethics Committee considers and makes
a recommendation concerning alternative language which would
make clear that advertising in any electronic media is improper.TO
The choice of Proposal "A" seems more, desirable than Proposal
"B." While "A" is written positively, "B" is stated negatively.7 1
Under "B," the enforcement problems discussed in Bates 72 would
be more acute because of the lack of clear-cut authorizations; af-
ter-the-fact determinations would be more numerous. Furthermore,
the lack of clear, affirmative standards might pose notice problems
when the State Bar Board attempts to enforce the rule against a
North Dakota lawyer charged with violating it.
The reason for the temporary adoption of Proposal "A" in North
Dakota was that the Ethics Committee was considering an amend-
ment to the proposal which would allow advertising in print media,
but would exclude advertising in all 'electronic broadcast media. 3
Proposal "A" was so amended,7 4 and final action on the proposal,
before sending the new rule on to the North Dakota Supreme Court,
was to have occurred at the regular meeting of the Executive Com-
mittee on October 13, 1977.7- Adverse response from the electronic
broadcast media in North Dakota to the amendment delayed final
action, until all interests could be heard. 76 As of this writing, the
interim rule remains in effect.
Lawyer advertising, under either proposal, will be most advan-
tageous to those lawyers practicing in heavily-populated, metropol-
itan regions. Similarly, the consumer in those same areas will be
most aided by such advertising. Even in the major population cen-
ters of North Dakota, the attorney remains visible by his service
affiliations and is known by his reputation. It is doubtful that a
69. Although no express authority permits the State Bar Association of North Dakota
to adopt rules of conduct for the legal profession of North Dakota, such authority may
be Implied from the express authority to keep a standing committee on ethics. STATE BAH
AssoCIATION OF NORTH DAKOTA CONST. BY-LAWS art. VII, § 1.
70. State Bar Association of North Dakota, news release, Sept. 20, 1977.
71. See supra notes 60-63 and text accompanying.
72. 97 S.Ct. at 2706-07.
73. State Bar Association of North Dakota, news release, Sept. 20, 1977.
74. The proposed North Dakota rule would be the same as ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
IIESPONSIBILITY DR 2-101(B) (1977), except that it would delete all language Permitting
advertisement by "radio broadcast." N.D. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR
2-101 (B) (proposed).
In addition, proposed Ethical Consideration 2-2 was amended by the addition of
the following statement: "It is considered that laypersons in receiving relevant lawyer ad-
vertising will be adequately served by print media." Letter from R. C. Heinley, chairman,
gthies & Internal Affairs Committpe to Robert P. Schuller, Executive Director, State Bar
Xssociation of North Dakota (Oct. 7, 1977).
75. State Bar Association of North Dakota, news release, Sept. 20, 1977.
76. Telephone Interview with Robert P. Schuller, Executive Director, State Bar As-
sociation of North Dakota (Oct. 20, 1977).
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noticeable number of North Dakota lawyers will utilize the new rule
and advertise. As North Dakota becomes more populated and more
urbanized, however, the opportunities for advertising may become
important and useful to both the lawyer and the consumer.
MICHAEL A. CAMPBELL
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-COURTS-ALL STATE COURT JURISDICTION Gov-
ERNED B. "MINIMUM CONTACTS"
Plaintiff filed a shareholder's derivative suit against Greyhound
Corporation, Greyhound Lines, Inc., and twenty-eight present or for-
mer corporate officers and directors.' In conjunction with the filing
of the shareholder's derivative suit plaintiff filed a motion for the se-
questration2 of the property of defendants located in DelawareS
The Delaware Supreme Court upheld the procedure of the Delaware
sequestration statute.4  On appeal to the United States Supreme
I. Plaintiff was a nonresident of Delaware. Greyhound Corporation was incorporated
under the laws of Delaware with its principal place of business In Phoenix, Arizona.
Greyhound's wholly owned subsidiary, Greyhound Lines, Inc., was incorporated in Cali-
fornia. and had its princilial place of business in Phoenix, Arizona. None of the twenty-
eight present or forner corporate officers or directors were residents of Delaware. Tile
actions, upon which the shareholder derivative suit was based', occurred In Oregon.
2. DEL. CODE tit. 10, § 366 (1975). This is the Delaware sequestration statute. It al-
lows a Delaware court to seize any or all property of a nonresident defendant in order
to compel appearance. The property may be sold under the order of the court, if the de-
fendant does not appear or otherwise defaults, to pay the demand of the plaintiff. If the
defendant enters a general appearance, he may upon notice to the plaintiff petition the
court for release of tile property. It appears from the Delaware statute that the defendant
may either default and lose the property or make a general appearance and submit him-
self in full to in personala jurisdiction.
3. DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 169 (1975). This statute places the situs of stock, of corpora-
tions incorporated in Delaware, In Delaware. The Court of Chancery attached such stock
as defendants owned In Greyhound Corporation pursuant to DEL. CODE tit. 10, § 366
(1975). Delaware Is the only state which has the situs of stock in the state of incorpora-
tion; this makes Delaware the situs of a great deal of corporate stock. The other forty-
nine states have adopted U.C.C. § 8-317 (1) (1972 version), which states as follows:
Attachment or levy upon security (1) No attachment or levy upon a secur-
Ity or any share or other interest evidenced thereby which is outstanding
shall be valid until the security Is actually seized by the officer making the
attachment or levy but a security which has been surrendered to the issuer
may be attached or levied upon at the source.
This statute Is found at N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-08-33 (1968).
4. Greyhound Corporation v. Meitner, - 'el.-, 361 A.2d 225 (1976). Appellants
contended that the sequestration procedure did not accord them due process, that the
property seized was not capable of attachment in Delaware, and that they did not have
sufficient contacts with Delaware to sustain jurisdiction of that state's cour's under the
rule of International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). See infra notes 14-17,
anld text accompanying.
Trihe Delawa Ire Snulolenie (Olrit, in rejecting alIellants' contentions, stated as follows:
(Jlurisdlction under 366 remains, as it was In 1963, quasi fit ren founded
on the presence of capital stock here, not on prior contacts by defendants
vitl tills foriill. [i lder 8 1)l. C1 . § 1(;9 tile "sitis of tihe ownership of tile (api-
tal stock of all corporations existlncr tinder the laws of this State . . . (is) In
this State," and that prov ides ile initial hais for jurisdiction.
